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After the end of the Civil War, slavery was formally 
abolished, and the right to vote and other civil rights for African-
Americans were finally enshrined into the Constitution of the 
United States via the Reconstruction Amendments.  However, 
such a narrow reading of the history of this period belies the 
nebulous boundary between “war” and peace.  As Yoram Din-
stein has noted, “[t]he phrase ‘war’ lends itself to manifold uses. 
. .  [and thus] may appear to be a flexible expression suitable for 
an allusion to any serious strife, struggle or campaign.”1   
This expansive notion of war is appropriate for describ-
ing African-Americans’ arduous path as they have struggled to 
achieve the status of equal human beings endowed with full civil 
rights.  This paper will examine how public officials with Con-
federate sympathies in the postwar South managed to preserve, 
in law and in practice, many of the badges of slavery that had 
ostensibly been eradicated by the Reconstruction Amendments 
and the early Civil Rights Acts; and will do so with specific ref-
erence to racial disparities imposed by the death penalty.2  Under 
our modern legal system, “much has remained consistent in the 
administration of injustice for black ‘defendants’… [since] the 
age of slavery, when blacks had little to nothing in the way of 
legal recourse.”3  Keeping in mind that capital punishment is an 
exercise of power over the powerless,4 this article seeks to trace 
the lineage of this inequality by examining the historical sym-
biosis between the application of the death penalty and the lega-
cies of slavery and apartheid in the United States. 
The analysis of this paper will proceed in three parts.  
First, I will present a historical overview of the institution of 
slavery that will clarify how it entrenches a social caste system 
by reducing the slave to an object of property.  Second, I will 
closely examine the period following the American Civil War to 
demonstrate how a faction of Southern public officials reestab-
lished the domination of whites in the postbellum South by for-
mally acknowledging civil rights for African-Americans while 
simultaneously continuing to subjugate them through both legal 
and quasi-legal channels.  Third, I will analyze how capital pun-
ishment has played a central role in allowing America to retain 
the indelible stain of racial inequality long after the emancipa-
tion of the slaves, purported to fulfill the egalitarian promise 
upon which America was founded. 
 
I. THE LAW OF SLAVERY FROM ROME TO  
ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 
 
SLAVES AS PROPERTY UNDER ROMAN LAW 
 
The institution of slavery reduces human beings to ob-
jects devoid of any protections against incursions upon their life, 
liberty, and dignity.  In order to understand how slaves were 
owned in antebellum America, it is helpful to trace the lineage 
of the legal institution of ownership back to the concept of do-
minium that emerged in the late Republican period of Ancient 
Rome.  Dominium “was the highest, the ultimate form of title to 
property, specifically distinguished from lesser types of property 
interest.”5  Under dominium, “[t]he owner was lord and master 
of his property.”6   
Slavery was widely practiced and deeply imbedded in 
the social order of Rome, and the distinction between slaves and 
free men was one of three constitutional elements of personhood 
under Roman law.7  This distinction had enormous juridical con-
sequences, as “in many ways slaves were regarded as property 
rather than as human beings.”8  As with any other object of 
property falling under the rubric of dominium, they were 
“things”9 without rights10 that “could be acquired, owned and 
disposed of.”11  
 The concept of dominium, with its almost unlimited 
powers for the owner, was a means of keeping the ever-
increasing slave population under control.12  This explains the 
stripping of juridical protection for slaves under dominium,13 
which meant that “a master could do what he liked with his 
slave, over whom he had the power of life and death.”14 
 
THOMAS HOBBES’ INFLUENCE ON ENGLISH THOUGHT  
ON SLAVERY  
 
Roman law was preserved throughout the Middle Ages 
via Justinian’s Digest15 and other ancient documents, and ulti-
mately formed the bedrock of most civil law systems that had 
developed in Continental Europe by the Sixteenth century.  
While the courts of England developed their own distinct brand 
of common law, Roman law was preserved by the English in 
their universities: for centuries, the elite establishments of Ox-
ford and Cambridge taught exclusively Roman law and not com-
mon law.  Against this backdrop, Seventeenth century political 
philosopher Thomas Hobbes published his Leviathan, “...a work 
which more than any other defined the character of modern poli-
tics.”16  According to Hobbes, whose philosophical treatise was 
heavily influenced by classical jurisprudence, prior to the estab-
lishment of civil society, human beings existed in a state of na-
ture.17  In this state, all men enjoyed a common capacity for do-
minion over all things in the world, as well as over one an-
other.18  Although all men were formally equal in this environ-
ment, scarcity of resources and unchecked animalistic impulses 
meant that life was a perpetual war, where every man was en-
emy to every man.19  The resulting quality of life was necessar-
ily “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”20  For these rea-
sons, Hobbes argued that it was imperative for humans to form 
social covenants, in which some men relinquished their natural 
dominion to a higher sovereign in exchange for peace and secu-
rity.21     
Hobbes postulated that these social covenants for estab-
lishing sovereign power of one human over another could be 
created either by acquisition (i.e., force)22 or by institution (i.e., 
consent).23  He described two ways of acquiring power by force:  
(1) by generation, “when a man maketh his children”24; or (2) by 
THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA:  
RIDING THE TROJAN HORSE OF THE CIVIL WAR 
By  
Michael Brazao* 
Special - Fall 2008                                                                                                                                                                                 27  
 
conquest, when a man “subdueth his enemies to his will.”25  In 
contrast to sovereign power that is forcefully acquired, Hobbes 
theorized that sovereign authority could also be instituted when 
men freely consent to give a higher authority - i.e. the state - the 
power and responsibility to ensure peace and security.26  The 
most obvious and direct mechanism through which a state pur-
sues this mandate is the criminal law.27  Hobbes was convinced 
that the quality of the sovereignty exercised by these two types 
of “commonwealths”28 was “the very same.”29  
In this sense, a family was akin to a “little 
Monarchy,”30 with the male head of the house-
hold exercising a despotic dominion over his 
underlings (including wives, children, and 
slaves) in the absence of any superseding au-
thority.  The power delegated to the resulting 
state often included the head of the family’s 
right to impose death upon his subjects.31  Once 
sovereign power was authoritatively vested in 
the state, “the sovereign of each [state] hath 
dominion over all that reside therein”,32 includ-
ing the children and slaves of the men who con-
vened the commonwealth, since “no man can 
obey two masters.”33    
Thus, two central themes become clear 
from Hobbes’ oeuvre:  power and inequality.  Hobbes felt no 
qualms over limiting the liberty of some humans so that peace 
and prosperity could prevail for society as a whole.  In his view, 
the sovereign power that some men exercised over others was 
merely a mutation of man’s natural right to self-defense,34 for if 
a man did not subordinate his enemy, there was nothing in the 
state of nature to stop his enemy from killing him.  In this way, 
“[v]iolence, as both a… fact and metaphor, [became] integral to 
the constitution of modern law.”35  Such violence has the direct 
effect of sustaining inequality, since “[l]aw in its determining 
effect cannot be everything.  Obviously, law must choose and 
elevate some modes of existence and suppress or ignore oth-
ers.”36 
 
FROM ANTIQUITY TO AMERICA:  THE ROMAN AND HOBBESIAN 
ROOTS OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 
 
 William Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the Laws 
of England, expanded on the Hobbesian undertones of legal 
domination.37  In one passage, he wrote: 
 
[t]here is nothing which so generally strikes 
the imagination and engages the affections of 
mankind, as the right of property; or that sole 
and despotic dominion which one man claims 
and exercises over the external things of the 
world, in total exclusion of the right of any 
other individual in the universe. 38 
 
This domination was reaffirmed as a distinctly American institu-
tion when James Madison wrote approvingly of “that dominion 
which one man claims and exercises over the external things of 
the world, in exclusion of every other individual.”39   
Premised upon the concept of dominion that emerged 
in Ancient Rome, slavery flourished in America for nearly a 
century after it was abolished in England.40  Together, these 
closely related legal institutions perpetuated a stark disparity in 
the valuation of human life between white Americans and Afri-
can-Americans.41  As Chief Justice Taney of the United States 
Supreme Court infamously stated in the Dred Scott decision, 
blacks were considered “so far inferior, that they had no rights 
which the white man was bound to respect.”42  This dearth of 
rights for slaves was consistent with Hobbes’s idea that the 
dominant class needed to reinforce the normative social order 
against the specter of insubordination.  In keeping with the Hob-
besian premise that sovereign power will only be delegated to a 
higher authority when the 
head of the household is in-
capable of maintaining peace, 
we would expect to see a rise 
in the application of sover-
eign state power in situations 
when the status quo is most 
threatened.  This expectation 
is supported by the observa-
tion that for most of the his-
tory of American slavery, 
“the controlling factor in a 
slave’s life was not the legis-
lation on the books but the 
master’s whim.  Though 
slaves were occasionally 
tried in courts and tribunals, the chattel slavery system gave 
slaveholders almost total control over their ‘property,’ including 
the manner in which slaves were punished.”43  However, as the 
institution of slavery continued to face mounting pressure, both 
from within the United States and a fledgling international 
movement toward its abolition,44 we see a gradual rise in the use 
of the law as a means of buttressing the American social hierar-
chy.  Therefore, although evidence from early colonial times 
shows some instances of equality under the law, laws dealing 
with law-breaking slaves grew more stringent as the slave popu-
lation increased and threats of slave insurrections rose.  These 
‘Slave Codes’ were extreme laws reflecting white supremacy 
and fear, and allowing slaves to be put to death for transgres-
sions ranging from helping a fellow slave escaping to destroying 
property.45 
Further evidence of the correlation between racially 
discriminatory penal practices and slavery is found in the higher 
preponderance of capital punishment in areas where slavery was 
most integral to the local economy.  Thus, we see that from a 
very early point in the colonial period, northern colonies, who 
had never been as reliant on plantation-based agriculture as the 
southern colonies, adopted much more lenient attitudes toward 
capital punishment,46 while “[i]n the South, capital punishment 
had a different history linked, in large part, to slavery.”47  Not 
only was capital punishment more prevalent in the South gener-
ally, but it “was a powerful tool for keeping the slave population 
in submission.”48  This was in part due to the perceived need to 
control them as they were not only a captive workforce, but also 
made up significant portions of the populations of many south-
ern states.”49   
As the above examples demonstrate, “[c]apital punish-
ment during this time… [embodied] an ‘emphatic display of 
power, a reminder of what the state could do to those who broke 
the laws.”50  The most brutal and extreme exhibitions of em-
phatic state power were almost always reserved for the subju-
gated classes, who had the most to gain from a disruption of the 
social status quo and the least to lose should their efforts be 
thwarted.  Therefore, in an attempt to ratchet up the deterrent 
Not only was capital punishment 
more prevalent in the South gener-
ally, but it “was a powerful tool for 
keeping the slave population in sub-
mission.” 
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value of criminal power against potential insurrection, “many 
executions were ‘intensified’ through extreme methods such as 
burning at the stake, dismemberment, dissection, and public 
display of bodies after death;”51 barbarous tactics that were usu-
ally, if not always, reserved for blacks.52  In fact, offences by 
slaves against their masters for crimes of “petit treason”53 were 
often brutally punished in a manner quite similar to those con-
victed of treason against the state.   
    The disparity in the application of capital punishment 
between the northern and southern regions of America continued 
to widen in the decades leading up to the Civil War.   Early 
movements in the 18th century to abolish or restrict the death 
penalty54 “were mostly concentrated in northern states,”55 and 
formed part of a broader movement toward the “rejection of 
other social institutions such as slavery.”56  This trend continued 
well into the Nineteenth century, when “[l]aws in northern states 
were ‘all in the direction of abolition’ from the 1820s through 
the 1850s.”57  At the same time, the abolitionist cause was much 
more attenuated in the South.  “This owed itself partly to the 
institution of slavery, which was firmly in place in the South 
until after the Civil War.”58  Even where modest abolitionist 
trends were observed in the South, the death penalty retained a 
distinctly racial flavor.  “No southern states abolished capital 
punishment completely, but every 
southern state did eliminate it for 
some crimes committed by 
whites.”59  Moreover, “in southern 
states, capital punishment was 
still used for crimes related to 
spreading discontent among free 
black people, insubordination 
among slaves, and even attempted 
rape by a black person against a 
white person.”60   
The disparity between 
northern and southern states is 
also visible in the differing pace 
at which executions ceased to be 
conducted as public spectacles.  
Whereas “from 1830 to 1860, every Northern state… moved its 
public hangings indoors” in response to a concern that public 
executions fostered “occasions for rioting, revelry and rib-
aldry,”61 the abolition of public executions took much longer in 
the South, with the last public execution occurring in 1936 in 
Kentucky.62  Because public executions were believed to engen-
der licentiousness, “[p]erceptions of unruly crowds meant public 
executions were no longer perceived as legitimate exercises of 
state power nor mechanisms to deliver a message of lawful retri-
bution.”63  This posed a much greater problem for southern au-
thorities, who relied more heavily on public executions to serve 
as a manifestation of force and pedagogy of power in order to 
secure their inequitable social hierarchies.64  Thus, it would be 
more difficult for southern authorities to accept that public exe-
cutions had a futile (or worse, a detrimental) effect on public 
order, since the public execution was so integral to the state’s 
“display of the majestic, awesome power of sovereignty.”65     
By the 1860s, it was apparent that the abyss between 
northern and southern states on the issue of slavery had become 
so entrenched that a war was inevitable.  The ultimate “victory” 
of Union forces on the battlefield, however, would prove to be a 
Pyrrhic victory in the struggle for equality. 
 
II. THE WAR THAT DIDN’T END  
 
THE RESISTANCE AGAINST RECONSTRUCTION 
 
The surrender of the Confederate army in the Spring of 
1865 marked the formal end of the American Civil War and 
ushered in the Reconstruction period of American history.  
While it is generally conceded that “[t]he Confederate generals 
surrendered honorably… the spirit of the South was hardly de-
feated.  Slavery was gone, but the idea of states’ rights and 
autonomy survived.”66  The indomitable spirit of the Confeder-
acy was apparent immediately following its surrender to Union 
forces.  In 1865, pending re-admission to the Union, every 
southern state passed a series of “Black Codes” that purported to 
reduce freed slaves to second class citizenship and give whites 
“some of the control of blacks they had during slavery.”67  Such 
thinly-veiled attempts at reintroducing slavery through the ju-
ridical back door were met with swift action after the 1866 fed-
eral election yielded a Congress devoted to the agenda of 
“Radical Reconstruction.” 
Under the doctrine of Radical Reconstruction, the fed-
eral government sought to ensure the adherence of recalcitrant 
southern authorities to the letter and spirit of the Reconstruction 
Amendments, which formally abolished 
slavery and extended voting and other civil 
rights to black freedmen.  In order to en-
sure compliance, Congress passed the Re-
construction Acts of 1867, placing the 
South under federal military control.68  It 
was under the authority of this martial law 
that freed slaves were registered to vote.  
The ensuing elections saw a handful of 
blacks elected to Congress, as well as size-
able black constituencies (and in some 
cases, majorities) elected to state public 
office.69     
As one can imagine, the federal laws 
passed immediately after the Civil War 
“had effected a complete revolution in [American] constitutional 
jurisprudence by transferring from the states to the United States 
[responsibility over] all the fundamental rights of citizens – their 
life, their liberty, and their property.”70  Such a massive change 
from the antebellum power dynamic in the South was met with 
considerable opposition by the recently deposed southern white 
establishment, who resented this complete rewriting of the 
“racial contract” upon which America had been founded.71  Such 
resentment was exacerbated by the perceived “fervor with which 
Reconstruction Republicans set about the legislative remodel-
ing” through legislative instruments “drawn in sweeping lan-
guage appropriate to the federal government’s new-found sense 
of power.”72    
 
THE NEW DEPARTURE:  THE TROJAN HORSE OF RACE RELA-
TIONS IN AMERICA 
 
The short-term effectiveness of Radical Reconstruction 
in ensuring the right to vote and civil rights for blacks was a 
humiliating blow to the supremacy of the white southern estab-
lishment after the Civil War.  Having recently faced military 
defeat through both the loss of the Civil War and the failure to 
resist the presence of federal troops during Radical Reconstruc-
tion, any hope for resurrecting a semblance of antebellum domi-
In 1865, pending re-admission to the 
Union, every southern state passed a 
series of “Black Codes” that pur-
ported to reduce freed slaves to sec-
ond class citizenship and give whites 
“some of the control of blacks they 
had during slavery.” 
Special - Fall 2008                                                                                                                                                                                 29  
 
nation required the adoption of a radical new strategy against 
an overbearing, even suffocating, federal presence.  This arti-
cle suggests that, at this point in American history, southern 
jurists adopted a strategy of apparent acceptance of the Recon-
struction agenda that actually allowed many badges of slavery 
to persist in relatively undiluted form.   
Southern authorities appear to have modeled their 
approach to restoring the antebellum status quo on a Roman 
precedent.  In the Aeneid, famed Roman poet Virgil recounts 
the legendary story of how Rome was founded.  One episode 
from this epic has since gained almost universal recognition 
in Western society:  the “Trojan Horse” used by the Greeks 
during their long siege upon the city of Troy.  The Greek 
army, whose “strength [was] broken in warfare” after many 
years of futile hostilities,73 offered the colossal wooden horse 
as a gift.  The Trojans accepted the horse as a token of peace 
and surrender, and brought it within their city’s walls.74  Later 
that night, as the Trojans slept, the horse “opened wide” and 
“emitted men,”75 who stole into the darkened city, “[l]et in 
their fellow soldiers at the gate, [a]nd joined their combat 
companies as planned.”76  This parable is instructive in under-
standing how the southern authorities regained the upper hand 
in the ongoing war for political supremacy in the postbellum 
South.      
As the Greeks realized in the Aeneid, the Southern 
establishment understood that they did not have sufficient 
military prowess to achieve their objectives through all-out 
war.  Thus, a new, less belligerent approach was needed to 
continue the struggle for “states’ rights.”  This strategy was 
first employed by a faction of southern Democrats known as 
“Redeemers,” whose primary political objective was the re-
turn of political sovereignty to the southern states through 
cooperation with and concession to the federal government 
and the North.77  The Redeemers gradually gained control of 
the party agenda through the implementation of a “New De-
parture” tactic, whereby the emphasis of political dialogue 
was shifted away from suffrage and civil rights to economic 
and other less controversial matters. The movement became 
so successful that within four years, all Democrats and most 
northern Republicans agreed that Confederate nationalism and 
slavery were dead and further federal military interference 
was unnecessary.78  By 1870, the Democratic–Conservative 
leadership across the South decided it had to end its opposi-
tion to Reconstruction as well as to black suffrage in order to 
survive and move on to new issues.79   
Like the Trojans, whose readiness to accept the 
Horse was likely prompted by a  desire to end a seemingly 
endless war with little prospect of victory in sight, the  will-
ingness of southern Democrats to suddenly surrender on such 
a major bone of political contention was welcomed by a belea-
guered Republican party yearning to turn the page on this 
chapter of American political history.80  The South’s willing-
ness to accept the new constitutional reality convinced the 
Republicans to adopt a let-alone policy toward the South.81  
The goal of the New Departure was ultimately achieved in the 
Compromise of 1877, whereby The South agreed to accept the 
hotly-disputed victory of Republican presidential candidate 
Rutherford Hayes in the election one year earlier, if he agreed 
to withdraw the last of the federal troops from their states.82  
At that point, all sides agreed that Reconstruction was fin-
ished.83  
 
Hobbes wrote, “war consists not in battle only, or the 
act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the will to con-
tend by battle is sufficiently known.”84  With those words in 
mind we understand how, in the course of Reconstruction, a 
hotly contested Civil War morphed into a cold war fought 
along political and juridical fronts.  With the perfection of the 
New Departure in 1877, it became clear that the courts were 
the new battlefield.85  Future grievances between the North 
and the South would be governed by the rule of law and the 
requirements of due process.  What remained to be seen was 
the extent to which the Supreme Court and Congress would go 
to eliminate the social implications of slavery and racial dis-
crimination.86  As African-Americans would soon learn, nei-
ther would go very far.  
The Supreme Court set the tone when it released a 
series of decisions that gradually overturned much of the Re-
construction civil rights legislation.  Beginning with the Civil 
Rights Cases87 of 1883, it held that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment only gave Congress the power to outlaw public, not pri-
vate, discrimination.88  The Court reinforced this ruling with 
Plessy v. Ferguson89 in 1896, announcing that state-mandated 
segregation was legal as long as the law provided for 
“separate but equal” facilities.  As a result, “[t]he strict limita-
tion of the postbellum amendments to state action expresse[d] 
the view called ‘states’ rights’ – the very position that the 
South fought for in the Civil War, which had ostensibly been 
repudiated not only by the war but also by the Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, as well as the civil 
rights acts of 1866 and of 1875.”90 
This laissez-faire line of Supreme Court jurispru-
dence permitted state courts to follow suit.  They enforced a 
wide range of postwar “Jim Crow Laws” that transformed the 
South into a virtual apartheid state, where African-Americans 
became second-class citizens continuing to bear many badges 
of the slavery from which they had supposedly been emanci-
pated.  While varying widely in their disregard of the Recon-
struction Amendments,91 what these laws had in common was 
“[t]hrough these means, the neutrality of the liberal state was 
formally upheld, as demanded by the social contract, without 
in any significant way challenging the racial polity.”92  Indeed, 
so striking was the ability of southern authorities to retain the 
essence of slavery through their juridical institutions, that “[i]f 
you look at the subsequent history of the United States, there 
is some truth in the paradoxical statement that the Confeder-
acy was born when Lee handed Grant his sword.”93   
 
III. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT’S ROLE IN  
EXTENDING THE BADGES OF SLAVERY  
 
LYNCHING AS A CONTINUATION OF WHITE DOMINION 
 
The central premise for the Compromise of 1877 was 
the understanding that Southern lawmakers would formally 
adhere to the aims of Reconstruction.  Thus, the art of the 
New Departure and its Jim Crow Laws was in how they 
spawned an entire movement allowing sovereignty over the 
South to be wrested from the federal government and returned 
to local white hands without appearing to violate the postbel-
lum Constitution.  Once this repatriation of sovereign control 
was complete, the subjugation of blacks resumed with zeal 
and was hindered only by a need to outwardly conform to due 
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process.  One stark example of this phenomenon was the prolif-
eration of lynching that occurred at the hands of local mobs.  
While it is generally conceded that the practice of lynching far 
predates the Civil War,94 it has also been observed that prior to 
that conflict “only rarely were the punishments imposed under 
what had come to be known as ‘Lynch’s Law’ specifically capi-
tal,”95 and it was only after Reconstruction that “the term 
‘lynching’ c[a]me to acquire its contemporary connotations,…
the targeting of African-Americans, and, more specifically, Afri-
can-American men, chiefly in the South, and the absence of the 
due process of law.”96   
       That the widespread lynching of blacks began its ascent 
following the New Departure is no coincidence.  Rather, this 
trend served as a useful “means of reaffirming an endangered 
form of white… identity… [and] a lethal means of regenerating 
the racial contract once the racial polity could no longer be se-
cured through the institution of chattel slavery.”97  “Lynchings 
were characterized by their celebratory and public nature, their 
brutal method of killing, their disregard for any semblance of 
due process for the accused, and an absence of punishment for 
the killers.”98  By restoring the antebellum dichotomy between 
racial classes99 and affirming life-or-death sovereignty of white 
males over blacks, “lynching provided a de facto extralegal res-
toration of the antebellum Black Codes.”100 
In order for the application of lynch law to survive the 
scrutiny of the Supreme Court, it was imperative that lynching 
cloak itself in the Court’s language condoning “private” dis-
crimination.  Southern law enforcement claimed that the state 
did not perpetuate the violence.  This fiction was enough to 
shield lynching from the scrutiny of the federal courts, since 
they had no jurisdiction to intervene on the mere grounds that 
state police and prosecutors were failing to solve crimes.  For 
these reasons, “conventional definitions of lynching [typically]
…draw a sharp line of demarcation between violence inflicted in 
the name of the law and that which stands 
outside or in violation of the law.”101  
Nonetheless, a brief peek under the hood 
of this ruse reveals the reality of state par-
ticipation in these supposedly “private” 
acts.  “[A]s the very phrase ‘lynch law’ 
implies… the mutually exclusive opposi-
tion between the legal and the illegal fails 
to appreciate how unstable and often irrele-
vant was the liberal formulation of the dis-
tinction between the official and unofficial, 
public and private, in the conduct of lynch-
ing.”102  The complicity of southern public 
officials in lynchings was entrenched by 
the refusal of southern senators in the 
United States Congress to endorse an anti-
lynching bill that would allow federal law enforcement officials 
to investigate and prosecute lynchings when local authorities 
failed to intervene.103  Although no less than seven presidents 
had requested such a law from Congress, and the House of Rep-
resentatives had passed an anti-lynching bill four times, “the 
Senate’s powerful southern senators used the filibuster to ensure 
that the bill never got a vote.”104  Once again, we see the modus 
operandi of the New Departure at work; southern lawmakers 
could invoke the democratic principle of legislative due process 
to perpetuate a racist legacy passed down from the antebellum 
era.   
 
Recent scholarship has challenged the conventional 
depiction of lynch law:  
 
[M]any lynchings should be classi-
fied not as irrational deeds perpetrated by 
mobs of private persons, acting without legal 
authority but, rather, as ritualized enactments 
that drew their authority from the unwritten 
racial contract of the white community and 
that patterned their proceedings, to a greater or 
lesser extent, on the very judicial procedures 
they are characteristically said to flout.105   
 
This argument maintains that the 
public spectacle lynchings of African-
Americans by whites in the post-
Reconstruction era “should be located not in 
the domain of the illegal or the extralegal but, 
rather, near the heart of a more comprehensive 
structure of racial control, one that vested in-
formal police powers in members of the white 
race and that encouraged vigilantism as a nec-
essary complement to its weak agencies of 
formally authorized political discipline.”106    
 
THE DEATH PENALTY AS A “LEGAL LYNCHING” 
 
While it is true that no region in America has displayed 
a historical monopoly over capital punishment, it is also true that 
“[d]eath penalty practice in America is highly regionalized.”107  
The plain fact of the matter is that “[m]ost modern executions 
occur in the South,”108 where “the death penalty is as firmly en-
trenched as grits for breakfast.”109  This pronounced regional 
disparity means that it is impossible to speak of an American 
pattern or single national profile 
regarding capital punishment.110  
This regionalization shares a close 
historical affinity with the institu-
tion of slavery, and its dispropor-
tionate application against blacks 
in the modern era is a vestige of 
the dominion historically enjoyed 
by the white elite establishment 
over blacks.   
A historical examination of capi-
tal punishment in America reveals 
its provocative correlation with 
lynching.111   The incidence of 
racially-motivated lynchings, 
which rose to prominence after 
Reconstruction, declined steadily from a peak in the 1890s and 
disappeared (or at least went into hiding)112 by the 1940s-
1950s.113  Despite this apparent success at eradicating racial vio-
lence, however, a judicial analogue had been created in its place.  
“With these ‘legal lynchings,’ whites deferred to the courts but 
remained ready to return to mob justice if the results were not 
favorable to them.”114  In this way, institutionalized racial vio-
lence against African-Americans was able to persist to a great 
degree.115  For example, over half (54%) of citizens executed 
between 1930 and 1967 were African-American,116 despite 
never comprising more than 11% of the American population 
during that time,117 and three out of five executions during that 
The plain fact of the matter is that 
“[m]ost modern executions occur in 
the South,”108 where “the death pen-
alty is as firmly entrenched as grits 
for breakfast.” 
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time took place in the southern states,118 where 90% of those 
executed for rape, 100% of those executed for burglary, and 
83% executed for armed robbery, were black.119   Throughout 
that period, blacks never consisted of more than 25% of the 
population of the South.120 
This statistical trend is faithful to the Redeemers’ strat-
egy of weaving antebellum attitudes into the fabric of democ-
ratic institutions.  Because legislatures and courts were enacting 
and applying facially neutral laws, the law provided a gloss of 
“stability and regularity”121 that was absent in the context of 
mob lynchings.  The genius of these legal lynchings was in how 
they co-opted the Constitution itself -specifically, the division of 
powers doctrine, as the pursuit of criminal prosecutions has his-
torically been understood as a matter of local concern- to shelter 
a racist institution.122  Under the pretense of due process,123 a 
legal apparatus was created that would “use force against its 
citizens without itself appearing like a criminal.”124  Much like 
the Greeks who attacked the city of Troy under cover of night-
fall, these complicit agents worked “in a state of relative invisi-
bility,”125 fostered by an “epistemology of ignorance”126 that 
deflected accusations of bias by pointing an exculpatory finger 
toward the incontrovertibly race-neutral language of the black-
letter law.127  As an end result, “[m]ore graphic forms of racial 
violence, such as spectacle lynching, became less imperative 
once white dominance was assured by less transparent but more 
calculable means,”128 and with the passage of time the Confeder-
acy’s most enduring weapon in perpetuating the subordination 
of blacks as “subpersons”129 has proven not to be the musket or 
the noose, but the gavel.130  
The ability of the state to impose the death penalty 
completes this paradigm.  “Along with the right to make war, the 
death penalty is the ultimate measure of sovereignty and the 
ultimate test of political power.”131  Thus, “[w]ith the end of 
slavery… [t]he belief that capital punishment was necessary to 
restrain a primitive black population became an article of faith 
among white southerners lasting well into the twentieth cen-
tury.”132  Because the death penalty treats “members of the hu-
man race as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with and dis-
carded,”133 it is the ultimate manifestation of the ability of the 
state “to do anything it pleases with life,”134 a direct Hobbesian 




The purpose of this analysis is not to illustrate that the 
American system of capital punishment system is tainted by 
race.  Rather, by tracing the link between the current practice of 
capital punishment and the classical doctrine of dominion, it 
attempts to expose how the imposition of state-sanctioned death 
in contemporary America is marred by the indelible stain of 
slavery.  Having been stealthily carried into modern jurispru-
dence via the Trojan Horse of the New Departure, the Hobbesian 
paradigm of a master wielding life-or-death dominion over his 
chattel remains a live concept in the American criminal justice 
system today, particularly in the South.  Through its racially 
selective administration, the modern application of the death 
penalty represents one of the most enduring fronts in the strug-
gle for legal equality, a vestige of a Civil War that purportedly 
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